Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/33568
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dc.contributor.authorCarpenter, Jeffrey P.en_US
dc.contributor.authorMatthews, Peter Hansen_US
dc.date.accessioned2005-05-12en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T09:12:52Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T09:12:52Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/33568-
dc.description.abstractThe enforcement of social norms often requires that unaffected third parties sanction offenders. Given the renewed interest of economists in norms, the literature on third party punishment is surprisingly thin, however. In this paper, we report on the results of an experiment designed to evaluate two distinct explanations for this phenomenon, indignation and group reciprocity. We find evidence in favor of both, with the caveat that the incidence of indignation-driven sanctions is perhaps smaller than earlier studies have hinted. Furthermore, our results suggest that second parties use sanctions to promote conformism while third parties intervene primarily to promote efficiency.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x1583en_US
dc.subject.jelC79en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelD64en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten_US
dc.subject.keywordvoluntary contribution mechanismen_US
dc.subject.keywordnormen_US
dc.subject.keywordthird party punishmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordreciprocityen_US
dc.subject.keywordindignationen_US
dc.titleNorm enforcement: anger, indignation or reciprocity?en_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn486061469en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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