Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/33568 
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dc.contributor.authorCarpenter, Jeffrey P.en
dc.contributor.authorMatthews, Peter Hansen
dc.date.accessioned2005-05-12-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T09:12:52Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T09:12:52Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/33568-
dc.description.abstractThe enforcement of social norms often requires that unaffected third parties sanction offenders. Given the renewed interest of economists in norms, the literature on third party punishment is surprisingly thin, however. In this paper, we report on the results of an experiment designed to evaluate two distinct explanations for this phenomenon, indignation and group reciprocity. We find evidence in favor of both, with the caveat that the incidence of indignation-driven sanctions is perhaps smaller than earlier studies have hinted. Furthermore, our results suggest that second parties use sanctions to promote conformism while third parties intervene primarily to promote efficiency.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x1583en
dc.subject.jelC79en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.jelD64en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten
dc.subject.keywordvoluntary contribution mechanismen
dc.subject.keywordnormen
dc.subject.keywordthird party punishmenten
dc.subject.keywordreciprocityen
dc.subject.keywordindignationen
dc.titleNorm enforcement: anger, indignation or reciprocity?-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn486061469en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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