Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/33550
Authors: 
Miettinen, Topi
Poutvaara, Panu
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 1918
Abstract: 
We argue that anti-corruption laws may provide an efficiency rationale for why political parties should meddle in the distribution of political nominations and government contracts. Anti-corruption laws forbid trade in spoils that politicians distribute. However, citizens may pay for gaining access to politicians and, thereby, to become potential candidates for nominations. Such rent-seeking results in excessive network formation. Political parties may reduce wasteful network formation, thanks to their ability to enter into exclusive membership contracts. This holds even though anti-corruption laws also bind political parties.
Subjects: 
political parties
two-sided platforms
network formation
JEL: 
D72
D85
L14
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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