Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/335184 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Helsinki GSE Discussion Papers No. 49
Verlag: 
Helsinki Graduate School of Economics, Helsinki
Zusammenfassung: 
We turn the zero-profit condition that is typically used to determine the number of firms into a game of entry/exit. We assume that identical firms compete in Cournot fashion, and when market conditions change, the equilibrium number of firms is determined in an entry/exit game. Focusing on symmetric equilibrium, the game may take several periods, and we determine the expected waiting time to reach the new equilibrium, as well as the economic value created during the adjustment period. The model is highly parametrised to allow for numerical results.
Schlagwörter: 
Entry/Exit dynamics
Mixed strategies
JEL: 
C72
C73
D43
L13
ISBN: 
978-952-7543-48-1
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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