Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/33517
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dc.contributor.authorGautier, Pieter A.en_US
dc.contributor.authorTeulings, Coen N.en_US
dc.contributor.authorvan Vuuren, Aicoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2005-11-01en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T09:12:25Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T09:12:25Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/33517-
dc.description.abstractWe characterize the equilibrium of a search model with a continuum of job and worker types, wage bargaining, free entry of vacancies and on-the-job search. The decentralized economy with monopsonistic wage setting yields too many vacancies and hence too low unemployment compared to first best. This is due to a business-stealing externality. Raising workers' bargaining power resolves this inefficiency. Unemployment benefits are a second best alternative to this policy. We establish simple relations between the losses in production due to search frictions and wage differentials on the one hand and unemployment on the other hand. Both can be used for empirical testing.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x1687en_US
dc.subject.jelJ3en_US
dc.subject.jelJ6en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordassignmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordon-the-job searchen_US
dc.subject.keywordsearch frictionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordefficiencyen_US
dc.subject.keywordoptimal UI benefitsen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsplatzsuchmodellen_US
dc.subject.stwLohnverhandlungenen_US
dc.subject.stwLohndifferenzierungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleOn-the-job search and sortingen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn502052562en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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