Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/33517 
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dc.contributor.authorGautier, Pieter A.en
dc.contributor.authorTeulings, Coen N.en
dc.contributor.authorvan Vuuren, Aicoen
dc.date.accessioned2005-11-01-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T09:12:25Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T09:12:25Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/33517-
dc.description.abstractWe characterize the equilibrium of a search model with a continuum of job and worker types, wage bargaining, free entry of vacancies and on-the-job search. The decentralized economy with monopsonistic wage setting yields too many vacancies and hence too low unemployment compared to first best. This is due to a business-stealing externality. Raising workers' bargaining power resolves this inefficiency. Unemployment benefits are a second best alternative to this policy. We establish simple relations between the losses in production due to search frictions and wage differentials on the one hand and unemployment on the other hand. Both can be used for empirical testing.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x1687en
dc.subject.jelJ3en
dc.subject.jelJ6en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordassignmenten
dc.subject.keywordon-the-job searchen
dc.subject.keywordsearch frictionsen
dc.subject.keywordefficiencyen
dc.subject.keywordoptimal UI benefitsen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsplatzsuchmodellen
dc.subject.stwLohnverhandlungenen
dc.subject.stwLohndifferenzierungen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleOn-the-job search and sorting-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn502052562en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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