Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/335176 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 477
Publisher: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Abstract: 
This paper revisits the n-player rent-seeking contest with homogeneous valuations and increasing returns. Our main result says that, for any m &#x2208; {2, . . . , n - 1}, there are threshold values 1 < R&#x2217;(m) < R&#x2217; (m) È 2 for the Tullock parameter R such that a pure strategy equilibrium with m active players exists if and only if R &#x2208; [R&#x2217;(m), R&#x2217; (m)]. Among other things, this observation leads to a simple characterization of the values of R for which the n-player contest has a unique pure strategy equilibrium.
Subjects: 
Rent-seeking contests
Increasing returns
Asymmetric equilibria
Monotone comparative statics
JEL: 
C72
D72
D74
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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