Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/33420 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 1831
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We suggest a political economy explanation for the stylized fact that intragenerationally more redistributive social security systems are smaller. We relate the stylized fact to an efficiency-redistribution trade-off to be resolved by political process. The inefficiency of social security financing is due to endogenous labor supply. Using data on eight European countries, we find that the stylized fact and a considerable degree of cross-country variation in contribution rates can be explained by the median voter model.
Schlagwörter: 
earnings-related and flat-rate benefits
applied political economy
public pensions
labour supply
JEL: 
H55
D72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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