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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 1570
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
This article studies the political choice over the extent and the means of income redistribution between high and low skilled workers. Redistributive tools encompass fiscal transfers with negative income tax and minimum wage. Using fiscal instruments only is assumed optimal. We show that high skilled workers may favor a second-best minimum wage requirement. This is because minimum wage increases unemployment, hence the marginal cost of redistribution is higher which gives a pretext for high skilled workers to moderate low skilled workers claim for income redistribution.
Schlagwörter: 
unemployment
political economics
income redistribution
minimum wage
JEL: 
D78
E24
H23
J38
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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