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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/33401
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Kaas, Leo | en |
dc.contributor.author | Madden, Paul | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2006-10-06 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-07-07T09:11:32Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-07-07T09:11:32Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2006 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/33401 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We consider a labour market model of oligopsonistic wage competition and show that there is a holdup problem although workers do not have any bargaining power. When a firm invests more, it pays a higher wage in order to attract workers from competitors. Because workers participate in the returns on investment while only firms bear the costs, investment is inefficiently low. A binding minimum wage can achieve the first-best level of investment, both in the short run for a given number of firms and in the long run when the number of firms is endogenous. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x2043 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D43 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J48 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | holdup | en |
dc.subject.keyword | investment | en |
dc.subject.keyword | minimum wage | en |
dc.subject.stw | Arbeitsmarkttheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Monopolistischer Wettbewerb | en |
dc.subject.stw | Oligopol | en |
dc.subject.stw | Mindestlohn | en |
dc.subject.stw | Investition | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Holdup in oligopsonistic labour markets: a new role for the minimum wage | - |
dc.type | |aWorking Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 510105750 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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