Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/33358
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dc.contributor.authorGoette, Lorenzen_US
dc.contributor.authorHuffman, Daviden_US
dc.contributor.authorMeier, Stephanen_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-09-22en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T09:11:05Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T09:11:05Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/33358-
dc.description.abstractDue to incomplete contracts, efficiency of an organization depends on willingness of individuals to take non-selfish actions, e.g., cooperate when there is no incentive to do so, or punish inefficient actions by others. Organizations also constitute a social boundary, or group. We investigate whether this social aspect of organizations has an important benefit, fostering unselfish cooperation and norm enforcement within the group, but whether there is also a dark side, in the form of hostility between groups. Our experiment provides the first evidence without the confounding effect of self-selection into groups. Individuals are randomly assigned to different platoons during a four-week portion of officer training in the Swiss Army. We conduct choice experiments - simultaneous prisoner's dilemma games, with and without third-party punishment - in week three. Random assignment significantly increases willingness to cooperate with fellow platoon members. Assignment does not lead to hostility, in the sense of vindictive punishment of outsiders, but does affect norm enforcement, enhancing willingness to enforce a norm of cooperation towards fellow platoon members. This suggests that the social aspect of organizations motivates efficient behavior even when ordinary incentives fail, and helps explain practices designed to foster social ties or group identification within an organization.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x2020en_US
dc.subject.jelD01en_US
dc.subject.jelD23en_US
dc.subject.jelJ00en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordorganizationsen_US
dc.subject.keywordin-group favouritismen_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial identityen_US
dc.subject.keywordpunishmenten_US
dc.subject.stwGruppentheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwKooperationen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Kontrolleen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleThe impact of group membership on cooperation and norm enforcement: evidence using random assignment to real social groupsen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn509597319en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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