Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/333293 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Economics and Statistics [ISSN:] 2366-049X [Volume:] 244 [Issue:] 5/6 [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 475-494
Publisher: 
De Gruyter Oldenbourg, Berlin
Abstract: 
We study workplace performance effects triggered by team-internal rivalry. Specifically, we focus on duos of goalkeepers in professional soccer competing for in-season playing time. Using performance data from the most prestigious European soccer leagues and tournaments, we provide evidence for asymmetric discouragement: While the ex ante underdog feels demotivated by internal rivalry, we cannot observe a comparable effect for the ex ante favourite. Moreover, we find that workplace competition generally works explicitly rather than implicitly, meaning that demonstrated performance outweighs pure skills when it comes to the emergence of peer effects. To address a potential endogeneity problem caused by non-random selection, we show that our results are robust to quasi-random rotations caused by (minor to moderate) injuries and bans.
Subjects: 
competition
goalkeepers
internal rivalry
performance
soccer
JEL: 
J44
L83
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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