Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/333227 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] International Tax and Public Finance [ISSN:] 1573-6970 [Volume:] 32 [Issue:] 6 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York [Year:] 2025 [Pages:] 1960-1987
Verlag: 
Springer US, New York
Zusammenfassung: 
Abstract We analyze whether mayors’ prior occupation in the local public administration matters for their performance. In theory, mayors’ professional background may shape their competence in bureaucratic tasks. We use the example of grant receipts for visible investment projects for which mayors must submit an extensive application to the state government. Our dataset includes 1,933 mayor elections (1993-2020) in the German state of Hesse to which we apply a sharp RD design for close mixed-background races. Mayors’ background on average has no effect on grant receipts. Yet, public administrator mayors do attract more grants than outsider mayors when they are ideologically aligned with the council, raising the motivation to apply for grants in the first place. We conclude that the competence of public administrator mayors only matters when they are motivated to use it, i.e. this is an example where incentives are necessary for the effects of political selection to materialize.
Schlagwörter: 
Public administration
Professional background
Administrative skills
Political selection
Mayors
Investment grants
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Sonstige Angaben: 
D73;D78;H71;H77;H83
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
Article
Dokumentversion: 
Published Version
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