Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/33307 
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 1777
Publisher: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
From an employer's perspective a tournament should induce agents to exert productive activities but refrain from destructive ones. We experimentally test the predictive power of a tournament model which suggests that within a reasonable framework productive and destructive activities are not influenced neither by the number of agents taking part in the tournament nor by the fraction of the winner prizes. Our results clearly confirm that sabotage in tournaments indeed occurs. While tournament size has virtually no effect on behavior, a balanced fraction of winner and loser prizes seems to particularly enhance productive activities.
Subjects: 
relative performance evaluation
personnel economics
sabotage
experiments
JEL: 
D23
J33
L23
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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