Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/33257
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dc.contributor.authorKoch, Alexander K.en_US
dc.contributor.authorNormann, Hans-Theoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2005-11-18en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T09:09:25Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T09:09:25Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/33257-
dc.description.abstractRecent bargaining experiments demonstrated an impact of anonymity and incomplete information on subjects' behavior. This has rekindled the question whether fair behavior is inspired by regard for others or is explained by external forces. To test for the importance of external pressure we compare a standard double blind dictator game to a treatment which provides no information about the source of dictator offers, and where recipients do not even know that they participate in an experiment. We find no differences between treatments. This suggests that those dictators who give are purely internally motivated, as asserted by models of other-regarding preferences.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x1703en_US
dc.subject.jelA13en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelD64en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keyworddictator gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordaltruismen_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial preferencesen_US
dc.subject.stwAltruismusen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleGiving in dictator games: regard for others or regard by others?en_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn496430904en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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