Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/331478 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 1292
Publisher: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Abstract: 
We consider a package assignment problem with money, in which a set M of objects is allocated to agents. Each agent has preferences that are not necessarily quasi-linear. The admissible set of object allocations is chosen by the planner to pursue specific objectives in conjunction with the rule. A rule satisfies constrained efficiency if no allocation - whose object allocation is admissible under the rule - Pareto dominates the outcome allocation. We study the compatibility between constraints on admissible object allocations and desirable properties of rules, and establish: A rule satisfies constrained efficiency and strategy-proofness, together with other mild properties, if and only if its admissible set is bundling unit-demand for some partition of M , satisfies no wastage and anonymity, and the rule is a bundling unit-demand minimum price Walrasian rule.
Subjects: 
Constrained efficiency
Strategy-proofness
Non-quasi-linear preferences
Minimum price Walrasian rule
Package auctions
JEL: 
D44
D47
D71
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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