Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/331412 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 1281
Publisher: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Abstract: 
We experimentally investigate exclusive-offer competition between two existing upstream firms. In theory, when upstream firms make exclusive offers to a downstream monopolist, both exclusion and non-exclusion can be equilibrium outcomes. By varying key parameters, we explore how bargaining power and product differentiation affect the likelihood of exclusion outcomes. We experimentally find that exclusion is more likely to be observed when the upstream firms have stronger bargaining power or when they produce more differentiated products; paradoxically, the higher upstream firms' profits from cooperatively offering unattractive exclusive contracts, the more likely they are to fall into intense exclusive-offer competition.
Subjects: 
Exclusive dealing
Exclusive-offer competition
Bargaining Power
Product differentiation
Laboratory experiment
JEL: 
L12
L41
L42
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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