Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/331410 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CEBI Working Paper Series No. 11/25
Verlag: 
University of Copenhagen, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Behavior and Inequality (CEBI), Copenhagen
Zusammenfassung: 
Many people forgo substantial economic gains by not responding to financial incentives, even in major decisions such as retirement savings and mortgage refinancing. But do the same people systematically fail to respond across financial contexts? We study this using a quasi-experimental setting that combines policy changes in pension incentives with shifts in mortgage refinancing incentives from interest rate fluctuations. Linking Danish administrative records, we uncover a striking independence between financial decisions: people who are inactive in one context are not systematically inactive in the other. One implication is that the costs of inaction are not concentrated among specific groups.
Schlagwörter: 
Tax incentives for pension savings
Mortgage refinancing
inaction
JEL: 
G51
H24
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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