Publisher:
Roskilde University, Department of Social Sciences and Business, Socio-Economic Research Centre (SECO), Roskilde
Abstract:
This article investigates the relationship between patterns of elite accumulation and conflict dynamics in Mozambique's natural-resource economy, with a specific focus on the gas-rich Cabo Delgado province. Utilizing the politics of anticipation and the accumulation by dispossession and political settlement approaches, the research analyses the evolving rent-seeking strategies of the ruling Frelimo coalition. Furthermore, it examines how the government's response to the insurgency, especially the involvement of Rwandan forces, can be integrated into the existing accumulation paradigm. The article argues that elite accumulation, characterized by alliances between ruling elite factions and international investors, has significantly marginalized local communities, contributing to conflict dynamics through four main mechanisms: the exclusion of local populations from economic benefits, the concentration of resource rents among ruling elite factions, the leveraging of anticipated future revenues, and intra-coalition factional competition that influences resource management. It concludes that competitive clientelism within Mozambique's ruling Frelimo Party, combined with ruling elite control over rent distribution, is playing a crucial role in shaping resource-related conflict dynamics.