Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/330548 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Citation: 
[Journal:] International Journal of Game Theory [ISSN:] 1432-1270 [Volume:] 54 [Issue:] 2 [Article No.:] 37 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Berlin, Heidelberg [Year:] 2025
Publisher: 
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Abstract: 
This paper examines cost allocation rules for minimum cost spanning tree (MCST) problems, focusing on the properties of merge-proofness and coalitional stability. Merge-proofness ensures that no coalition of agents has the incentive to merge before participating in the cost allocation process. On the other hand, coalitional stability ensures that no coalition has the incentive to withdraw from the cost allocation process after the cost allocation proposal is made. We propose a novel class of rules called induced rules, which are derived recursively from base rules designed for two-person MCST problems. We demonstrate that induced rules exhibit both merge-proofness and coalitional stability within a restricted domain, provided that the corresponding base rules satisfy specific conditions.
Subjects: 
Minimum cost spanning tree problems
Cooperative games
Induced cost allocation rules
Merge-proofness
Coalitional stability
JEL: 
C71
D61
D79
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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