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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IWH Discussion Papers No. 17/2025
Verlag: 
Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH), Halle (Saale)
Zusammenfassung: 
I estimate management opposition to unions in terms of hiring discrimination in the German labor market. By sending 13,000 fictitious job applications, revealing union membership in the CV and pro-union sentiment via social media accounts, I provide evidence for hiring discrimination against union supporters. Callback rates are on average 15% lower for union members. Discrimination is strongest in the presence of a high sectoral share of union members and large firm size. I further explore variation in regional and sectoral strike intensity over time and find suggestive evidence that discrimination increases if a sector is exposed to an intense strike. Discrimination is positively associated with the sectoral share of firms that voluntarily orientate wages to collective agreements. These results indicate that hiring discrimination can be explained by union threat effects.
Schlagwörter: 
correspondence audit
field experiments
industrial relations
labor disputes
management opposition
trade unions
union threat
JEL: 
C93
J51
J53
J71
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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