Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/330301 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
ILE Working Paper Series No. 88
Publisher: 
University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics (ILE), Hamburg
Abstract: 
A new consensus appears to have emerged among academics and policy practitioners: Governments can be made to respect constitutional rules by establishing and constitutionally entrenching watchdogs, such as anti-corruption commissions, electoral commissions, or ombudspersons. In this article, we evaluate the consequences of what we propose to call the New York Consensus. We find that fourth branch agencies can increase constitutional compliance, but their effects are largely limited to higher income countries with a democratic political system.
Subjects: 
New York Consensus
fourth branch
integrity branch
guarantor branch
constitutional compliance
de jure-de facto gap
separation of powers
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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