Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/330155 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Economics & Management Strategy [ISSN:] 1530-9134 [Volume:] 34 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Wiley [Place:] Hoboken, NJ [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 782-793
Publisher: 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Abstract: 
We demonstrate that the incentives of firms that partially own their suppliers or customers to foreclose rivals depend on how the partial owner can extract profit from the target. Compared to a fully vertically integrated firm, a partial owner may obtain only a share of the target's profit but may have significant influence over the target's strategy. We show that the incentives for customer and input foreclosure can be higher, equal, or even lower with partial ownership than with a vertical merger, depending on how the protection of minority shareholders and transfer price regulations affect the scope for profit extraction.
Subjects: 
foreclosure
minority shareholdings
partial ownership
profit shifting
vertical integration
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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