Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/330139 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 16 [Issue:] 3 [Article No.:] 25 [Year:] 2025 [Pages:] 1-36
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
This article explores the impact of procedural information on the behavior of students under two school admission procedures commonly used in the US, the EU, and other jurisdictions: the Gale-Shapley mechanism and the Boston mechanism. In a lab experiment, I compare the impact of information about the mechanism, information about individually optimal application strategies, and information about both. I find that strategic and full information increases truth-telling and stability under the Gale-Shapley mechanism. Under the Boston mechanism, however, the adoption of equilibrium strategies remains unaffected. Contrary to the prevailing assumptions in matching theory, the Boston mechanism improves perceived fairness. These results underscore the importance of procedural transparency and suggest that eliminating justified envy may not be sufficient to foster fairness and mitigate litigation risks.
Subjects: 
matching markets
school choice
deferred acceptance
immediate acceptance
advice
fairness
law and market design
JEL: 
C78
C92
D47
I20
K10
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
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