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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 16 [Issue:] 2 [Article No.:] 13 [Year:] 2025 [Pages:] 1-25
Verlag: 
MDPI, Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
We present a simple model where, before competing in prices, firms announce which prices they intend to choose. Deviating from these announcements involves a cost. We show that sharing pricing intentions results in prices being set above their competitive levels. All equilibria result in prices that are higher than in the absence of announcements. When the deviation cost of not sticking to the price announcement is high, the unique equilibrium market outcome is asymmetric, as with price leadership. When this cost is low, a symmetric equilibrium exists with even higher prices. Product differentiation is a key ingredient to these results.
Schlagwörter: 
collusion
price competition
information sharing
asymmetries
JEL: 
D44
L96
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