Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/330120 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 16 [Issue:] 1 [Article No.:] 6 [Year:] 2025 [Pages:] 1-15
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
The concept of the Condorcet winner has become central to most electoral models in the political economy literature. A Condorcet winner is the alternative preferred by a plurality in every pairwise competition; the notion of a k-winner generalizes that of a Condorcet winner. The k-winner is the unique alternative top-ranked by the plurality in every competition comprising exactly k alternatives (including itself). This study uses a spatial voting setting to characterize this theoretical concept, showing that if a k-winner exists for some 𝑘>2, then the same alternative must be the 𝑘′-winner for every 𝑘′>𝑘. We derive additional results, including sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of a k-winner for some 𝑘>2.
Subjects: 
elections
k-winners
Condorcet winner
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Article
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