Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/330075 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 15 [Issue:] 2 [Article No.:] 6 [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 1-15
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
Two groups produce a network good perceived by a third party, such as a police or military institution, as a 'public bad', referred to as 'crime' for simplicity. These two groups, considered mafias, are assumed to be antagonists, whether they are enemies or competitors in the same market, causing harm to each other's activities. This paper provides guidelines for the policymaker, typically the police, seeking to minimize overall crime levels by internalizing these negative externalities. One specific question is investigated: the allocation of resources for the police. In general, we recommend a balanced crackdown on both antagonists, but an imbalance in group sizes may lead the police to focus on the more criminal group.
Subjects: 
crime
networks
strategic complementarity
strategic substitutability
JEL: 
D19
D74
D79
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
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