Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/329978 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 13 [Issue:] 5 [Article No.:] 67 [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 1-19
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
We test whether the decisions in a common-pool resource game are better modeled game- theoretically as strategic substitutes or complements using an individual-level dataset of groundwater usage that accounts for 3% of US irrigated agriculture. Based on a regression framework with instrumental variables, we find support for strategic complements, suggesting that reciprocity- and/or race-to-depletion-like dynamics are key to understanding groundwater usage.
Subjects: 
common-pool resources
US agriculture
groundwater
dynamic game theory
panel data
identification
JEL: 
C72
Q12
Q20
Q25
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
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