Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/329977 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 13 [Issue:] 5 [Article No.:] 66 [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 1-13
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
We consider a clearing problem in peer-to-peer energy markets, where prosumers can trade energy among each other and with the main grid to meet their energy demands. By using a game- theoretic formulation and exploiting operator-theoretic methods for generalized Nash equilibrium seeking, we propose two variants of the state-of-the-art distributed market clearing mechanism with improved convergence speeds. Furthermore, we design a third variant that allows for equilibrium selection, i.e., computing a specific market solution based on a convex preference function of the network operator, e.g., a congestion cost. We provide convergence guarantees and numerically show the advantages of our proposed algorithms in terms of convergence speed up and obtaining reduced grid congestion.
Subjects: 
economic dispatch
market clearing algorithms
operator-theoretic methods
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Article
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