Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/329588 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] ACRN Journal of Finance and Risk Perspectives (JOFRP) [ISSN:] 2305-7394 [Volume:] 9 [Issue:] 1 [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 15-31
Verlag: 
ACRN Oxford Research Network, Oxford
Zusammenfassung: 
This research develops a new argument that departs from traditional theories that explain the potential impact of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) on Chiefs Executive Officers (CEOs) compensation. More specifically, we argue that if CSR investments provide value for firm's shareholders and stakeholders, they can also decrease firm's competitors' value (negative externality hypothesis). As a result, inefficient CEO compensation may arise even if CSR choice allows managers to act in the best interest of firm's shareholders and non-investing stakeholders. In sum, our new perspective indicates that excessive levels of CEO compensation are more than a principal-agent-stakeholder problem. In addition, our new theoretical argument suggests that voluntarily CSR should not be a relevant factor for achieving efficient levels of CEO compensation.
Schlagwörter: 
Corporate social responsibility
CEO compensation
Negative externality
Market failure
Stakeholder`s management
Public interest theory
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
cc-by-sa Logo
Dokumentart: 
Article

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
350.3 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.