Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/328466 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Citation: 
[Journal:] Economies [ISSN:] 2227-7099 [Volume:] 10 [Issue:] 7 [Article No.:] 166 [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 1-17
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
Radial symmetry, by our definition, is a precise condition on continuous ideal-point distributions, rarely if ever found exactly in practice, that is similar to the classical 1967 symmetry condition of Plott but pertains to an infinite electorate; the bivariate normal distribution provides an example. A Condorcet cycle exists if the electorate prefers alternative X to Y, Y to Z, and Z to X. An alternative K is a Condorcet winner if there is no alternative that the electorate prefers to K. Lack of a Condorcet winner may engender turmoil. The nonexistence of a Condorcet winner implies that a Condorcet cycle exists. Radial symmetry precludes the existence of Condorcet cycles and thus guarantees a Condorcet winner; but this result assumes that all voters weight the dimensions alike. Our counterexamples show that a Condorcet cycle can arise, even under radial symmetry, if the weighting of issues varies across voters. This finding may be of more than theoretical value: It may suggest that in an empirical setting (without radial symmetry), a Condorcet cycle may be more frequent if voters differ as to how they weight the dimensions. We examine, for illustration based on two dimensions (left-right, linguistic), a Condorcet preference cycle in Finland's 1931 presidential election.
Subjects: 
Condorcet cycle
Condorcet paradox
Condorcet winner
multidimensional issue space
radial symmetry
spatial modeling
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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