Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/328205 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 18075
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
We study the role of purpose-based rules for behavior and outcomes in a threshold public good game. Rules can be sufficient or even inflated in terms of proposing a fulfilling behavior. We conduct a lab experiment to describe the implications caused by the inflation of a rule. Our study shows that inflated rules are obeyed less. Yet, rule-following occurs also with inflated rules which leads to lower efficiency regarding exactly providing the threshold. A fair share option can help to coordinate efficiently. We complement our analysis by the investigation of the role of the implemented rules for the ex-post optimal behavior, i.e. evaluating the individual contribution depending on the individual payoff.
Subjects: 
rule-following
coordination
cooperation
groups
thresholds
public goods
JEL: 
C9
H41
M5
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.