Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/327683 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 12073
Verlag: 
Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research - CESifo GmbH, Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We develop a method for detecting cartels in multistage auctions. Our approach allows a firm to be collusive when facing members of its cartel yet competitive when facing others. Intuitively, as initial bids are shaded, close initial bids not only imply similar costs but also provide an incentive to undercut. We detect firm pairs that ignore this incentive when facing each other. Our algorithm predicts Ukraine's Antimonopoly Committee's sanctions: firm pairs classified as collusive are 8.98 times more likely (standard error 2.65 times) to be sanctioned. It also uncovers additional collusion: 1,857 collusive firms participate in 15.57% of auctions, increasing costs by 1.95%.
Schlagwörter: 
public procurement
collusion
online markets
JEL: 
H57
D44
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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