Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/327676 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 12066
Publisher: 
Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research - CESifo GmbH, Munich
Abstract: 
We study infinitely repeated games in which the players' rates of time preference may evolve endogenously in the course of the game. Our goal is to strengthen the folk theorem of Kochov and Song (2023) by relaxing the assumption of observable mixtures. To that end, we identify and impose a new sufficient condition on preferences. The condition holds automatically in the standard case of time-separable utilities and a common discount factor, while being generic in ours.
Subjects: 
folk theorem
recursive utility
endogenous discounting
unobserved mixtures
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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