Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/327114 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 25-046
Verlag: 
ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim
Zusammenfassung: 
Many business relationships begin with informal interactions and later transition to formal contracts. Using a repeated-games model with a finite horizon, we show that this hybrid-contracting approach can both prolong cooperation (intensive margin) and enable it across a broader range of settings (extensive margin). We model the contract as a "smooth-landing contract" that limits actions only near the end of the relationship. We show that this flexible design supports early cooperation and outperforms rigid contracts. Our findings are robust to changes in contracting costs and timing, with optimal contract length balancing profitability and implementability.
Schlagwörter: 
cooperation
hybrid contracting
relational contracts
repeated games
strategic alliances
JEL: 
C73
D86
K12
L14
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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