Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/327112 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 25-044
Verlag: 
ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper proposes a game-theoretic model to analyze the strategic behavior of inc-dec gaming in market-based congestion management (redispatch). We extend existing models by considering incomplete information about competitors' costs and a finite set of providers. We find that inc-dec gaming is also a rational behavior in markets with high competition and with uncertainty about network constraints. Such behavior already occurs in our setup of two regions. Comparing market-based redispatch with three theoretical benchmarks highlights a lower efficiency level of market-based redispatch and inflated redispatch payments. Finally, we study seven variations of our basic model to assess whether different market fundamentals or market design changes mitigate incdec gaming. None of these variations eliminate inc-dec gaming entirely.
Schlagwörter: 
Energy market
Game theory
Auctions/bidding
Congestion management
Inc-dec gaming
JEL: 
D43
D44
L13
Q41
Q48
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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