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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] BRQ Business Research Quarterly [ISSN:] 2340-9444 [Volume:] 26 [Issue:] 3 [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 256-280
Verlag: 
Sage Publishing, London
Zusammenfassung: 
This study contributes to the emerging literature on board co-option by examining how and to what extent co-opted directors influence managers' attitudes about earnings management. We find robust evidence that co-option mitigates both real activities and accrual-based earnings management. Our findings support the view that higher co-option reduces managerial short-termism because it enhances managers' job security as co-opted directors are known to be less likely to remove managers from office. Our results are robust to different measures of both co-option and earnings management, and they continue to hold after accounting for endogeneity and selection concerns. Finally, we provide additional evidence showing that a higher degree of co-option lowers the likelihood of the chief executive officer (CEO) being forcefully removed from the office for managing earnings in the previous year.
Schlagwörter: 
Corporate governance
board co-option
earnings management
JEL: 
G30
G34
G39
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