Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32633
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorPloner, Matteoen_US
dc.contributor.authorSchmelz, Katrinen_US
dc.contributor.authorZiegelmeyer, Anthonyen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-20T14:34:36Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-20T14:34:36Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32633-
dc.description.abstractWe report three repetitions of Falk and Kosfeld's (2006) C5 and C10 treatments whose results largely conflict with those of the original study. We mainly observe hidden costs of control of low magnitude which lead to low-trust principal-agent relationships. We also report an extension where performance-based rewards are absent i.e. both principals and agents are paid according to a at participation fee. Our extension largely reproduces the striking findings of the original study. In particular, we observe that hidden costs outweigh benefits of control.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv. [u.a.] |cJenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena economic research papers |x2010,007en_US
dc.subject.jelC81en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelM52en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordControlen_US
dc.subject.keywordExperimental Economicsen_US
dc.subject.keywordIncentivesen_US
dc.subject.keywordIntrinsic Motivationen_US
dc.subject.keywordTrusten_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungskontrolleen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsanreizen_US
dc.subject.stwMotivationen_US
dc.subject.stwVertrauenen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleHidden costs of control: Three repetitions and an extensionen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn621700193en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

Files in This Item:
File
Size
670.95 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.