Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32624
Authors: 
Große, Niels Daniel
Kirchkamp, Oliver
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Jena economic research papers 2009,065
Abstract: 
In this paper we are studying a multiple player two-armed bandit model with two risky arms in discrete time. Players have to find the superior arm and can learn from others' history of choices and successes. In equilibrium, there is no con?ict between individual and social rationality. If agents depart from perfect rationality and use count heuristics, they can benefit from coordination (or centralization) of search activities. We test the conjecture that agents gain from coordination with a between-subject design in two treatments. In the experiments we find no gains from coordination. Instead, we find less severe deviations from the equilibrium strategy in the non-coordinated treatment
Subjects: 
two-armed bandit
parallel search
coordination
experiment
JEL: 
C91
D83
O33
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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