Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32614
Authors: 
Güth, Werner
Levati, Maria Vittoria
Ploner, Matteo
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Jena economic research papers 2009,071
Abstract: 
We study ultimatum and dictator experiments where the first mover chooses the amount of money to be distributed between the players within a given interval, knowing that her own share is fixed. Thus, the first mover is faced with scarcity, but not with the typical trade-off between her own and the other's payoff. Removing the trade-off inspires significant generosity, which is not affected by the second mover's veto power. On the whole our results confirm heterogeneity in behavior, but point to efficiency concerns as the predominant motive.
Subjects: 
Ultimatum
Dictator
Social Preferences
JEL: 
C70
C91
D63
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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