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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/32604
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Güth, Werner | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-03-22 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-05-20T14:34:13Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-05-20T14:34:13Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32604 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Although one may hope to achieve equality of stated profits without enforcing it, one may not trust in such voluntary equality seeking and rather try to impose rules (of bidding) guaranteeing it. Our axiomatic approach is based on envy-free net trades according to bids which, together with the equality requirement, characterize the first-prize auction and fair division game. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJena | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aJena Economic Research Papers |x2010,014 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D44 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D63 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D74 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Auctions | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Fair Division | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Procedural fairness | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Envy-Freeness | en |
dc.subject.stw | Auktionstheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Verteilungsgerechtigkeit | en |
dc.subject.stw | Neid | en |
dc.subject.stw | Gerechtigkeit | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Rules (of bidding) to generate equal stated profits: An axiomatic approach | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 62227399X | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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