Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/32604 
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dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werneren
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-22-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-20T14:34:13Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-20T14:34:13Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32604-
dc.description.abstractAlthough one may hope to achieve equality of stated profits without enforcing it, one may not trust in such voluntary equality seeking and rather try to impose rules (of bidding) guaranteeing it. Our axiomatic approach is based on envy-free net trades according to bids which, together with the equality requirement, characterize the first-prize auction and fair division game.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena Economic Research Papers |x2010,014en
dc.subject.jelD44en
dc.subject.jelD63en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelD74en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordAuctionsen
dc.subject.keywordFair Divisionen
dc.subject.keywordProcedural fairnessen
dc.subject.keywordEnvy-Freenessen
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen
dc.subject.stwVerteilungsgerechtigkeiten
dc.subject.stwNeiden
dc.subject.stwGerechtigkeiten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleRules (of bidding) to generate equal stated profits: An axiomatic approach-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn62227399Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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