Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32604
Authors: 
Güth, Werner
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Jena economic research papers 2010,014
Abstract: 
Although one may hope to achieve equality of stated profits without enforcing it, one may not trust in such voluntary equality seeking and rather try to impose rules (of bidding) guaranteeing it. Our axiomatic approach is based on envy-free net trades according to bids which, together with the equality requirement, characterize the first-prize auction and fair division game.
Subjects: 
Auctions
Fair Division
Procedural fairness
Envy-Freeness
JEL: 
D44
D63
C72
D74
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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