Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32589
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dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werneren_US
dc.contributor.authorKirchkamp, Oliveren_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-15en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-20T14:34:01Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-20T14:34:01Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32589-
dc.description.abstractMany economic experiments are run in the laboratory with students as participants. In this paper we use a newspaper experiment to learn more about external validity of lab research. Our workhorse is the Yes-No game. Unlike in ultimatum games responders of the Yes-No games do not know the proposal when deciding between whether to accept it or not. We use two different amounts that can be shared (100€ and 1000€). In line with findings for the ultimatum game, offers were fairer and rejections less likely when participants are older and submit their decisisons via mail rather than the Internet. By comparing our results with other studies (using executives or students), we demonstrate, at least for this type of game, the external validity of lab research.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv. [u.a.] |cJenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena economic research papers |x2010,006en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelC93en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.subject.stwZeitungen_US
dc.subject.stwInterneten_US
dc.titleWill you accept without knowing what? A Thuringian newspaper experiment of the Yes-No Gameen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn618601422en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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