Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32575
Authors: 
Güth, Werner
Pull, Kerstin
Stadler, Manfred
Stribeck, Agnes
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Jena economic research papers 2010,018
Abstract: 
In two-person generosity games the proposer's agreement payoff is exogenously given whereas that of the responder is endogenously determined by the proposer's choice of the pie size. Earlier results for two-person generosity games show that participants seem to care more for efficiency than for equity. In three-person generosity games equal agreement payoffs for two of the players are either exogenously excluded or imposed. We predict that the latter crowds out - or at least weakens - efficiency seeking. Our treatments rely on a 2x3 factorial design differing in whether the responder or the third (dummy) player is the residual claimant and whether the proposer's agreement payoff is larger, equal, or smaller than the other exogenously given agreement payoff.
Subjects: 
generosity game
equity
efficiency
experiment
JEL: 
C7
C91
D03
D3
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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