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dc.contributor.authorMigrow, Dimitrien
dc.contributor.authorUhl, Matthiasen
dc.date.accessioned2009-10-21-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-20T14:33:46Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-20T14:33:46Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32571-
dc.description.abstractThe notion of choice inconsistency is widely spread in the literature on behavioral economics. Several approaches were used to account for the observation that people reverse their choices over time. This paper aims to explain the formation of resolutions regarded as internal self-binding devices. It moves away from anthropocentric neoclassicism and embraces a more atomistic notion of a player by defining intrapersonal agents as strategic actors. The magnitude of state-dependency is seen as a key driver of intrapersonal conflict modelled by the incongruity of the preferences of two opposing agents. The sequential conceptualisation basically allows for experimental testingen
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena Economic Research Papers |x2009,060en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelD01en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordMultiple Selvesen
dc.subject.keywordAgencyen
dc.subject.keywordIntrapersonal Conflicten
dc.subject.keywordResolutionsen
dc.subject.keywordSelf-Bindingen
dc.subject.keywordSelf-Controlen
dc.subject.keywordCommitmenten
dc.subject.stwEntscheidungen
dc.subject.stwPersönlichkeitspsychologieen
dc.subject.stwPräferenztheorieen
dc.subject.stwSelbstverpflichtungen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleThe resolution game: A multiple selves perspective-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn610739727en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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