Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32558
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dc.contributor.authorBauernschuster, Stefanen_US
dc.contributor.authorDuersch, Peteren_US
dc.contributor.authorOechssler, Jörgen_US
dc.contributor.authorVadovic, Radovanen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-10-07en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-20T14:33:35Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-20T14:33:35Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32558-
dc.description.abstractThe question whether a minimum rate of sick pay should be mandated is much debated. We study the effects of this kind of intervention in an experimental labor market that is rich enough to allow for moral hazard, adverse selection, and crowding out of good intentions to occur. We find that higher sick pay is reciprocated by workers through higher effort but only if sick pay is not mandated. We also study adverse selection effects when workers have different probabilities of getting sick and can reject the hypothesis that this leads to market breakdown. Overall, we find that mandating sick pay actually leads to a higher voluntary provision of sick pay by firms.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv. [u.a.] |cJenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena economic research papers |x2009,076en_US
dc.subject.jelJ3en_US
dc.subject.jelC7en_US
dc.subject.jelC9en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordsick payen_US
dc.subject.keywordsick leaveen_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten_US
dc.subject.keywordgift exchange.en_US
dc.subject.stwLohnfortzahlungen_US
dc.subject.stwVersicherungspflichten_US
dc.subject.stwBetriebliche Sozialleistungenen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsmotivationen_US
dc.subject.stwAustauschtheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleMandatory sick pay provision: A labor market experimenten_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn610119354en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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