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Autoren: 
Bauernschuster, Stefan
Duersch, Peter
Oechssler, Jörg
Vadovic, Radovan
Datum: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2009,076
Zusammenfassung: 
The question whether a minimum rate of sick pay should be mandated is much debated. We study the effects of this kind of intervention in an experimental labor market that is rich enough to allow for moral hazard, adverse selection, and crowding out of good intentions to occur. We find that higher sick pay is reciprocated by workers through higher effort but only if sick pay is not mandated. We also study adverse selection effects when workers have different probabilities of getting sick and can reject the hypothesis that this leads to market breakdown. Overall, we find that mandating sick pay actually leads to a higher voluntary provision of sick pay by firms.
Schlagwörter: 
sick pay
sick leave
experiment
gift exchange.
JEL: 
J3
C7
C9
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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