Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32554
Authors: 
Weikard, Hans-Peter
Wangler, Leo
Freytag, Andreas
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Jena economic research papers 2009,077
Abstract: 
Almost all international environmental agreements include a minimum participation rule. Under such a rule an agreement becomes legally binding if and only if a certain threshold in terms of membership or contribution is reached. We analyze a cartel game with open membership and heterogeneous countries to study the endogenous choice of a minimum participation rule and its role for the success of international environmental agreements.
Subjects: 
Minimum participation rules
international environmental agreements
coalition formation
transboundary pollution
environmental policy coordination
JEL: 
D62
H41
D02
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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