Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32553
Authors: 
Fischer, Sven
Steiger, Eva-Maria
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Jena economic research papers 2009,107
Abstract: 
We experimentally test whether intentional and observable discriminatory pay of symmetric agents in the Winter (2004) game causes low paid agents to reduce effiort. We control for intentionality of wages by either allowing a principal to determine wages or by implementing a random process. Our main observations are that discrimination has no negative effiect on effiorts and principals do not shy away from using discriminatory pay if it is observable. Rather, with experience discrimination enhances efficiency as it facilitates coordination among agents. The only evidence for reciprocity is that subjects receiving a low payment from a principal (discriminatory or not) exert signïi¬cantly less effort.
Subjects: 
wage discrimination
experimental study
envy
reciprocity
pay secrecy
JEL: 
C72
C91
D21
J31
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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