Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/32550 
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper Series 2 No. 2010,02
Publisher: 
Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt a. M.
Abstract: 
Based on detailed regulatory intervention data among German banks during 1994-2008, we test if supervisory measures affect the likelihood and the timing of bank recovery. Severe regulatory measures increase both the likelihood of recovery and its duration while weak measures are insignificant. Results seem not to be driven by regulators directing measures to particularly bad banks. That is, our results remain intact when we exclude banks that eventually exit the market due to restructuring mergers or moratoria. More transparent publication requirements of public incorporation that indicate more exposure to market discipline are barely or not at all significant. Increasing earnings and cleaning credit portfolios are consistently of importance to increase recovery likelihood, whereas earnings growth accelerates the timing of recovery. Macroeconomic conditions also matter for bank recovery. Hence, concerted micro- and macro-prudential policies are key to facilitate distressed bank recovery.
Subjects: 
Bank distress
capital support
regulation
recovery
JEL: 
G28
C41
G21
ISBN: 
978-3-86558-613-1
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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