Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/325035 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 12044
Verlag: 
CESifo GmbH, Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
Using a large sample of US Bank Holding Companies during 1995-2023, we find that a standard measure of franchise value predicts lower bank capitalization and higher bank risk of insolvency. The franchise value hypothesis (FVH), postulating a negative relationship between bank franchise value and bank risk-taking, is thus rejected in our sample. We then construct proxy measures of bank pricing power rents and rents due to government guarantees, and show that an increase in either type of rents is associated with higher franchise values. Furthermore, higher rents are positively and significantly associated with higher operating costs, suggesting the existence of a rent-efficiency trade-off. To rationalize our empirical findings, we calibrate two standard financial models of the banking firm and examine the theoretical implications of a banking industry model featuring imperfect competition, agency costs, and endogenous market structure. These models support FVH incentive mechanism, but equilibrium outcomes do not necessarily imply a negative relationship between franchise value and bank risk-taking.
Schlagwörter: 
Tobin Q
bank risk of insolvency
bank rents
JEL: 
C21
E44
G21
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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